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A THEORY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH
OVER THE LIFE CYCLE*
Titus J. Galama and Hans van Kippersluis
Motivated by the observation that medical care explains only a relatively small part of the socio-
economic status (SES)-health gradient, we present a life-cycle model that incorporates several
additional behaviours that potentially explain (jointly) a large part of observed disparities. As a result,
the model provides not only a conceptual framework for the SES-health gradient but more generally
an improved framework for the production of health. We derive novel predictions from the theory by
performing comparative dynamic analyses. More generally, our comparative dynamic method can be
applied to models of similar form, e.g. human capital, health deficits, firm investment, to name a few.
Disparities in health across socio-economic status (SES) groups – often called the SES-
health gradient – are substantial. For example, Case and Deaton (2005) show how in
the US, a 20-year-old low-income (bottom quartile of family income) male, on average,
reports to be in similar health as a 60-year-old high-income (top quartile) male. In
cross sectional data, the disparity in health between low and high SES groups appears
to increase over the life cycle until ages 50–60, after which it narrows. These patterns
exist across a wide range of measures of SES, such as education and wealth, and across
all indicators of health, including the onset of chronic diseases, disability and mortality
(Adler et al., 1994; Marmot, 1999). The pattern is also remarkably similar between
countries with relatively low levels of protection from loss of work and health risks, such
as the US, and those with stronger welfare systems, such as the Netherlands (Case and
Deaton, 2005; Smith, 2007; Van Kippersluis et al., 2010).
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Recent significant contributions to the understanding of socio-economic disparities
in health have concentrated on the identification of causal effects, but have stopped
short of uncovering the underlying mechanisms that produce the causal relationships.
For example, education is found to have a causal protective effect on mortality (Lleras-
Muney, 2005) but it is not known exactly how the more educated achieve their health
advantage (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010).
Case and Deaton (2005) argue that it is extremely difficult to understand the
relationships between health, education, income, wealth and labour-force status
without some guiding theoretical framework. Integrating the roles of proposed
mechanisms and their long-term effect into a theoretical framework allows
researchers to disentangle the differential patterns of causality and assess the
interaction between mechanisms. Such understanding is essential in designing
effective policies to reduce disparities (Deaton, 2002). It is no surprise then that
several authors (Case and Deaton, 2005; Cutler et al., 2011) have pointed to the
absence of a theory of SES and health over the life cycle and have emphasised the
importance of developing one.
This article develops a conceptual framework for health and SES in which the SES-
health gradient is the outcome of rational (constrained) individual choices made over
the life cycle. The article makes two main contributions. The first main contribution is
of a fundamental nature and consists of extending the canonical human-capital model
for the demand for health (Grossman, 1972a,b) in two ways. First, we employ a
relatively straightforward extension by allowing for decreasing returns to scale in
health investment of the health-production process (see Galama and Kapteyn, 2011;
Galama and van Kippersluis, 2013; Galama, 2015, for the reasoning behind this
extension). Second, motivated by the observation that differences in medical care
usage explain only a small part of the health gradient (Adler et al., 1993), we conduct
an extensive review of the literature from multiple disciplines to identify the most
important mechanisms through which socio-economic characteristics such as wealth,
earnings and education, interact with health. We then include several additional
decisions regarding health (besides health investment), such as choices regarding
lifestyle (exercise, healthy/unhealthy consumption), working conditions, labour-force
participation and longevity, as mechanisms generating disparities in health. In doing
so, we develop a comprehensive theory of the SES-health gradient, by integrating the
most important interactions between health, longevity, health behaviour and SES
(wealth, education and earnings) during adulthood.1
1 Several papers contain components of our generalised theory of health. The Grossman model
(Grossman, 1972a,b) contains health and health investment and interactions with earnings, and wealth but
lacks other health behaviours. Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) were the first to introduce endogenous longevity,
but their model does not include other decisions besides health investment. Forster (2001) models the
relation between health, longevity, healthy consumption and unhealthy consumption but does not model
health investment, wealth accumulation or job conditions. Case and Deaton (2005) include unhealthy
consumption as well as physical effort on the job, but do not model longevity. In work independently
developed around the same time as our theory, Dalgaard and Strulik (2014), Strulik (2015) and Dalgaard and
Strulik (2017) present the so-called health-deficit models that contain health and health investment and
interactions with earnings, labour-force participation and wealth, but lack other health behaviours. Strulik
(2016) calibrates a related theoretical model in which health behaviour and SES influence health and
longevity, but he does not model job conditions.
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Because of the inclusion of a rich set of endogenous health behaviours, endogenous
health and endogenous longevity, the theory can be employed to analyse the value of
health as well as the value of life. Previous papers employing a life-cycle model for the
value of life include Rosen (1988), Ehrlich (2000), Becker (2007) and Kuhn et al.
(2015). In contrast to these papers, but in line with Murphy and Topel (2006), we
distinguish between the value of health and the value of longevity. We go beyond
Murphy and Topel (2006) by treating health and longevity endogenously: individuals
seek to optimise both health and longevity. We find that the value of health and the
value of life are distinct concepts that vary with age and by SES in distinct ways. For
example, calibrated simulations suggest the value of life decreases near the end of life
whereas the value of health increases. Assessments of the value of a statistical life
generally involve investigating how much individuals need to be paid for taking a
certain risk of death (usually in a setting of hazardous work). In practice, such
estimates may capture the monetary value (compensating variation) of both the effect
of changes in health and changes in longevity. In our theory, individuals are willing to
engage in a certain amount of unhealthy consumption or job hazards for the
instantaneous benefits it provides, as long as these benefits outweigh the associated
health cost: the reduction in life-time utility due to health loss. Our theory suggests that
unhealthy job conditions as well as risky health behaviours may be used in empirical
work to evaluate both the value of health and the value of life.
Our second main contribution consists of deriving detailed predictions from the
theory by performing comparative dynamic analyses of the effects of wealth, earnings,
education and health on health behaviour and longevity. We are the first to perform
such analyses analytically for a comprehensive theory with multiple health behaviours
(to better model health) andmultiple dimensions of SES (to model disparities in health
for several measures of SES).2 The comparative dynamic analyses not only deliver novel
predictions regarding the SES-health gradient (see below), but more generally provide
an alternative and complementary method to calibration and/or estimation in
exploring model characteristics. They provide a method for researchers to explore
their own research questions of interest. The method can be applied to models of
similar form, for example, human capital, health deficits, firm investment, rational
addiction, habit formation and resource extraction, to name a few. This work is
therefore potentially also relevant to these and other areas of economics.
The comparative dynamic analyses provide insight into the mechanisms through
which SES and health interact, and generate novel testable predictions. We highlight a
few here and discuss these and several others more extensively in Section 3.
First, wealth, earnings and education affect health behaviour by increasing the
marginal value of health relative to the marginal value of wealth. Intuitively, wealth,
2 Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) generate a set of directional predictions (their table 3), based on a
pioneering comparative dynamic analysis of the Grossman model with endogenous longevity. However, while
they are able to generate the sign of the effects (broadly whether an effect is more or less likely to be positive
or negative), they do not present dynamic results. Further, they do not consider other health behaviours
besides health investment. Ried (1998) presents a comparative dynamic analysis of the Grossman model, but
his model is limited to the linear case, which has distinct properties (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Galama,
2015). Eisenring (1999) presents a comparative dynamic analysis of a simple model without consumption,
wealth accumulation or health behaviours.
© 2018 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
A T H EO R Y O F D I S P A R I T I E S I N H E A L TH 3
earnings, and the higher earnings associated with education relax the budget
constraint. At higher levels of wealth, and hence consumption, only limited marginal
utility is gained from additional consumption and it is not beneficial to consume
more. In contrast, health extends length of life, providing additional time during
which consumption, leisure, and health can be enjoyed. This leads to higher SES
individuals to place a higher value on their health and to invest more in it (Becker,
2007; Hall and Jones, 2007).
A higher marginal value of health, in turn, increases the marginal benefits of healthy
consumption, and the marginal costs of unhealthy working (and living) environments,
and unhealthy consumption. This leads to healthier behaviour and gradually to greater
health advantage with age. The more rapidly worsening health of low SES individuals
may lead to early withdrawal from the labour force and associated lost earnings, further
widening the gradient in early and mid-age. The model allows for a subsequent
narrowing of the SES-health gradient, due to mortality selection and potentially
because low SES individuals increase their health investment and improve their health
behaviour faster as a result of their more rapidly worsening health. Our model is thus
able to replicate the life-cycle patterns of the SES-health gradient.
Second, we predict a central role for our concept of a ‘health cost’ of unhealthy
behaviours. The health cost is the marginal value (in terms of life-time utility) of health
lost due to detrimental health behaviours. It takes into account all future consequences
of current health behaviour. As a result of differences in the health cost, our theory
predicts that high SES individuals are more likely to drink moderately but less likely to
drink heavily (Van Kippersluis and Galama, 2014); and that individuals are willing to
accept unhealthy working conditions in mid-life, given the high monetary benefits
during those years, but that their willingness declines later in life due to an increasing
health cost. Thus, the concept of a health cost has potential for explaining variation in
health behaviours over the life cycle and across SES groups.3
Third, we predict that the ability to postpone death (endogenous longevity) is
crucial in explaining observed associations between SES and health. Absent the ability
to extend life (fixed horizon), associations between SES and health are small. If,
however, life can be extended, SES and health are positively associated and the greater
the degree of life extension, the greater is their association. The intuition behind this
result is that the horizon (longevity) is a crucial determinant of the return to
investments in health. This suggests that in settings where it is difficult for wealthier,
higher income and higher educated individuals to increase life expectancy (e.g. due to
3 While the concept of a health cost (benefit) of unhealthy (healthy) behaviour is not new, explicit
theoretical modelling is, and so is our formal definition of the concept. The literature on the value of a
statistical life (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003) focuses on the cost of reductions in life (mortality) rather than in health
(morbidity) as in our theory. Even the seminal theory of rational addiction (Becker and Murphy, 1988), while
arguing conceptually for an effect of unhealthy addictive consumption on health, does not explicitlymodel this
effect (see Jones et al., 2014, for an exception). To the best of our knowledge, only Forster (2001), Case and
Deaton (2005), Strulik (2016) and Schuenemann et al. (2017) have previously explicitlymodelled behaviour as
a choice variable affecting health. Case and Deaton’s (2005) model, however, focuses on the linear case, which
has distinct properties (Ehrlich andChuma, 1990; Galama, 2015). And while Forster (2001), Strulik (2016) and
Schuenemann et al. (2017) model a health cost/health benefit by allowing consumption to affect health, our
comparative dynamic analyses allow us to formally define, discuss and analyse the concept, investigate how it
influences various health behaviours and the health gradient, and make predictions.
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a high disease burden, competing risks, low efficiency of health investment, etc.),
health disparities across socio-economic groups would be smaller.
These are just a few examples of how the theory can be used as a conceptual
framework in conjunction with the comparative dynamic analyses to generate testable
predictions for the complex relationships between SES and health. The theory is rich,
and it is impossible to produce an exhaustive list of its possible uses. Researchers can
use the theory and detailed comparative dynamic analyses presented here as a template
to study their own questions of interest.
The article is organised as follows. Section 1 reviews the literature on health
disparities by SES to determine the essential components required in a theoretical
framework. Developing a theory requires simplification and a focus on the essential
mechanisms relating SES and health. To keep the model relatively simple, we focus on
explaining health disparities in adulthood.4 We highlight potential explanations for
the SES-health gradient that: (i) explain a large part of the gradient; and (ii) are
relatively straightforward to include in our theoretical framework. Based on these
principles, we develop our theoretical formulation in Section 2. Section 3 presents
dynamics and calibrated simulations, Section 4 presents comparative dynamic analyses
and makes predictions and Section 5 summarises and concludes.
1. Components of a Theory of the Gradient
In this Section, we review the empirical literature to determine the essential
components of a theory of health disparities by SES in adulthood. Based on these
findings, we present our theoretical formulation.
A significant body of research across multiple disciplines (including epidemiology,
sociology, demography, psychology, evolutionary biology and economics) has been
devoted to documenting and explaining the substantial disparity in health between
low and high SES groups. The pathways linking the various dimensions of SES to
health are diverse: some cause health, some are caused by health and some are
jointly determined with health (Cutler et al., 2011). Several key findings can be
identified.
1.1. Medical Care
Utilisation of medical services and access to care explain only a relatively small part of
the association between SES and health (Adler et al., 1993). Therefore, additional
mechanisms, besides medical care, have to be included in the model.
4 James Heckman and colleagues have emphasised the role of childhood cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities in determining both education and health outcomes in later life (Cunha and Heckman, 2007;
Heckman, 2007; Conti et al., 2010; Campbell et al., 2014; Almond and Currie, 2011), and there is strong
evidence that parental, especially maternal, SES influences the evolution of child health (Currie, 2009),
suggesting that part of the SES-health gradient may be determined very early in life.
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1.2. Work Environment and Lifestyle
Epidemiological research highlights the importance of lifestyles (e.g. smoking, drinking,
caloric intake and exercise), psychosocial and environmental risk factors, neighbour-
hood social environment, acute and chronic psychosocial stress, social relationships and
supports, sense of control, fetal and early childhood conditions, and physical, chemical,
and psychosocial hazards and stressors at work (House et al., 1994; Lynch et al., 1997).
During adulthood, two of those mechanisms appear to be of particular importance:
(i) working conditions; and (ii) lifestyles. Using three different data sets from the UK
and the US, House et al. (1994) find that features of the psychosocial working
environment, social circumstances outside work and health behaviour jointly account
for much of the social gradient in health. Some epidemiological studies suggest that
around two-thirds of the social gradient in health deterioration could be explained by
working environment and lifestyle factors alone (Borg and Kristensen, 2000). Low SES
individuals more often perform risky, manual labour than high SES individuals and
their health deteriorates faster as a consequence (Marmot et al., 1997; Ravesteijn et al.,
2013). Case and Deaton (2005) find that those who are employed in manual
occupations have worse health than those who work in professional occupations and
that the health effect of occupation operates at least in part independently of the
personal characteristics of the workers. Extensive research further suggests an
important role of lifestyle factors, particularly smoking, in explaining SES disparities
in health (Mackenbach et al., 2004). Fuchs (1986) argues that in developed countries,
it is personal lifestyles that cause the greatest variation in health.
1.3. Education
Education appears to be a key dimension of SES and studies suggest education has a
causal protective effect on health and mortality (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Conti et al.,
2010; Van Kippersluis et al., 2011).5 Education increases wages (Mincer, 1974),
thereby enabling purchases of health investment goods and services (though higher
wages also increase the opportunity cost of time). Education potentially increases the
efficiency of medical and preventive care usage and time inputs into the production
of health investment (Grossman, 1972a,b). The higher educated are also better able
at managing their diseases (Goldman and Smith, 2002), and benefit more from new
knowledge and new technology (Lleras-Muney and Lichtenberg, 2005; Glied and
Lleras-Muney, 2008).
1.4. Financial Measures of SES
Financial measures of SES may have a more limited impact on health than education.
Smith (2007) finds no effect of financial measures of SES (income, wealth and change
in wealth) on changes in health. Cutler et al. (2011) provide an overview of empirical
findings and conclude that the evidence points to no, or a very limited, impact of
5 Yet, see, e.g. Albouy and Lequien (2009) and Clark and Royer (2013) who could not establish a causal
effect of education on mortality.
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income or wealth on health (Michaud and van Soest, 2008). Yet, this view is not
unequivocally accepted. For example, Lynch et al. (1997) suggest that accumulated
exposure to economic hardship causes bad health, and Herd et al. (2008) argue that
there might be causal effects of financial resources on health at the bottom of the
income or wealth distribution. Income and wealth enable purchases of medical care
and thereby potentially allow for better health maintenance. Further, more affluent
workers may choose safer working and living environments since safety is a normal
good (Viscusi, 1978). But, higher wages are also associated with higher opportunity
costs, which would reduce the amount of time devoted to health maintenance.
1.5. Health and Labour-force Withdrawal
In the other direction of causality, studies have shown that perhaps the most dominant
causal relation between health and dimensions of SES in adulthood is the causal
impact that poor health has on one’s ability to work, and hence produce income and
wealth (Case and Deaton, 2005; Smith, 2007). Healthy individuals are also more
productive and earn higher wages (Currie and Madrian, 1999).
1.6. Joint Determination
Fuchs (1986) has argued that the strong correlation between SES and health may be
due to differences in the time preferences of individuals, which affects investments in
both education and health. Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2008) argue that differences in
individual preferences (risk aversion and discount rates) appear to explain only a small
portion of the SES-health gradient, but they also note that preferences are difficult to
measure and that preferences with respect to health may differ from preferences with
respect to finance. Other third factors known to contribute to the correlation between
SES and health are cognitive and non-cognitive skills, in particular conscientiousness
and self-esteem (Auld and Sidhu, 2005; Chiteji, 2010; Conti et al., 2010; Savelyev,
2014).
1.7. Gradient over the Life Cycle
Health inequalities are largest in mid-life and narrow in later life. The literature
provides competing explanations for this pattern. The cumulative advantage hypoth-
esis states that health inequalities emerge by early adulthood and subsequently widen
as economic and health advantages of higher SES individuals accumulate (House et al.,
1994; Ross and Wu, 1996; Lynch, 2003). Any apparent narrowing of SES inequalities in
late life is largely attributed to mortality selection, i.e. lower SES people are more likely
to die which results in an apparently healthier surviving disadvantaged population.6
The competing age-as-leveler hypothesis maintains that later in life deterioration in
health becomes more closely associated with age than with any other predictor, i.e.
6 Beckett (2000) and Baeten et al. (2013), however, have demonstrated that the convergence in health
inequalities in later life cannot be explained entirely, or even mostly, by mortality selection.
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through a greater equalisation of health risks (House et al., 1994), with the result that
the SES-health gradient narrows.
2. Theory
2.1. Theoretical Formulation
In this Section, we formalise the above discussion on the features of a theoretical
framework for the SES-health gradient over the life cycle. The aim is to understand the
SES-health gradient as the outcome of rational constrained individual behaviour.
A natural starting point for a theory of the relation between health and SES is a
model of life-cycle utility maximisation. Our model is based on the Grossman model of
the demand for health (Grossman, 1972a,b, 2000) in continuous time (Wagstaff,
1986a; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997; Galama, 2015). The
Grossman model provides a framework for the interrelationship between health,
financial measures of SES (wealth, wages and earnings), the demand for consumption,
the demand for medical goods and services and the demand for time investments in
health (e.g. visits to the doctor, exercise). Health increases earnings (through reduced
sick time) and provides utility. We add six additional features to the model.
First, we assume decreasing-returns-to-scale (DRTS) in investment of the health-
production process. This addresses the degeneracy of the solutions for investment and
health that characterises commonly employed linear investment models (Ehrlich and
Chuma, 1990; Galama, 2015). It is further attractive in that the health-production
process is generally thought of as being subject to diminishing returns (Wagstaff,
1986b).
Second, individuals choose their level of ‘job-related health stress’, which can be
interpreted broadly, ranging from physical working conditions (e.g. hard or risky
labour) to psychosocial aspects of work (e.g. low social status, lack of control,
repetitive work, etc.) that are detrimental to health. Individuals may accept risky
and/or unhealthy work environments, in exchange for higher pay (Muurinen, 1982;
Case and Deaton, 2005), i.e. a compensating wage differential (Smith, 1776; Viscusi,
1978).
Third, we allow consumption patterns to affect the health deterioration rate
(Grossman, 1972b; Forster, 2001; Case and Deaton, 2005; see Cawley and Ruhm, 2012,
for a review of theoretical models of health behaviours). We distinguish healthy
consumption (such as the consumption of healthy foods, sports and exercise) from
unhealthy consumption (such as smoking, excessive alcohol consumption). Healthy
consumption provides utility, and is associated with health benefits in that it lowers the
health deterioration rate. We interpret healthy consumption broadly to include
decisions regarding housing and neighbourhood.7 Unhealthy consumption provides
consumption benefits (utility) but increases the health deterioration rate.
7 Living in an affluent neighbourhood is an expensive, yet health-promoting and utility-generating choice.
It is a constrained choice: low SES individuals cannot afford to live in more affluent areas.
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Fourth, the effect of education on income is included in a straightforward manner
by assuming a Mincer-type wage relation, in which earnings are increasing in the level
of education and in the level of experience of workers (Mincer, 1974).
Fifth, individuals endogenously optimise length of life (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990).
Longevity is an important health outcome and differential mortality by SES may
explain part of the narrowing of the gradient in late life. Moreover, length of life is an
essential horizon that determines the duration over which the benefits of health
investments and healthy behaviours can be reaped.
Last, we include leisure, which jointly with sick time and time inputs into health
investment and into health behaviour allows for the modelling of an implicit
retirement decision. As health declines, increased sick time and increased demand for
time inputs into health investment and healthy behaviour reduce the amount of time
that can be devoted to work, capturing possible reverse causality from health to labour
force participation, and thereby financial measures of SES.
Individuals maximise the life-time utility function:
Z T
0
U ðtÞebtdt; (1)
where time t is measured from the time an individual has completed her education and
joined the labour force (e.g. around age 25 or so), T denotes total lifetime
(endogenous), b is a subjective discount factor and individuals derive utility
U ðtÞ  U ½ChðtÞ; CuðtÞ; LðtÞ; H ðtÞ from healthy consumption ChðtÞ, unhealthy con-
sumption CuðtÞ, leisure L(t) and health H(t). Utility is assumed to be strictly concave
and increasing in its arguments.
Healthy ChðtÞ and unhealthy CuðtÞ consumption are produced following a Becker
(1965) home-production model by combining goods, XhðtÞ and XuðtÞ, purchased in
the market and own time inputs, sCh ðtÞ and sCu ðtÞ:
ChðtÞ  Ch ½XhðtÞ; sCh ðtÞ; lCh ðtÞ; (2)
CuðtÞ  Cu½XuðtÞ; sCu ðtÞ; lCu ðtÞ; (3)
where lCh ðtÞ and lCu ðtÞ are (exogenous) efficiency factors.
The objective function (1) is maximised subject to three constraints. The first relates
to the production of health capital:
@H ðtÞ
@t
¼ I ½mðtÞ; smðtÞ;E   dðtÞ: (4)
Health H(t) can be improved through health production I[m(t),sm(t); E]. Goods and
services m(t) (e.g. medical care) as well as own time inputs sm(t) (e.g. exercise, time
spent visiting a doctor, etc.) are used in the production of health I[m(t), sm(t); E]. We
assume the following functional form:
I ½mðtÞ; smðtÞ;E   lI ðt;EÞmðtÞaI smðtÞbI ; (5)
where the efficiency of the health-production process lI(t; E) is assumed to be a
function of the consumer’s stock of knowledge E as the more educated are assumed to
be more efficient consumers and producers of health (Grossman, 1972a,b). The
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health-production function I[m(t), sm(t); E] is assumed to exhibit DRTS
(0\ aI þ bI \ 1).
Health (see (4)) deteriorates at the health deterioration rate dðtÞ 
d½t; ChðtÞ; CuðtÞ; zðtÞ; H ðtÞ; nðtÞ. The health deterioration rate depends endogenously
on healthy consumption ChðtÞ, unhealthy consumption CuðtÞ, job-related health stress
z(t), and health H(t).8 Consumption can be healthy (@d=@Ch  0; e.g. healthy foods,
healthy neighbourhood) or unhealthy (@d=@Cu [ 0; e.g. smoking). Greater job-
related health stress z(t) accelerates the ‘ageing’ process (@d/@z > 0). The deteriora-
tion rate depends in a flexible way on health, instead of the usual assumption of a
linear relationship d(t) = d(t)H(t) as in Grossman (1972a,b) and the related literature
(but see Dalgaard and Strulik, 2014, for an exception), and ξ(t) denotes a vector of
exogenous environmental conditions. Last, we have a fixed initial H(0) = H0 and a
fixed end condition H(T) = Hmin for health.
9
The second constraint is the total time budget Ω:
X ¼ swðtÞ þ LðtÞ þ smðtÞ þ sCh ðtÞ þ sCu ðtÞ þ s½H ðtÞ; (6)
where the total time available in any period Ω is the sum of all possible uses sw(t)
(work), L(t) (leisure), sm(t) (health investment), sCh ðtÞ (healthy consumption), sCu ðtÞ
(unhealthy consumption) and s[H(t)] (sick time).
The third constraint concerns the dynamic relation for financial assets:
@AðtÞ
@t
¼ rAðtÞ þ Y ðtÞ  pXh ðtÞXhðtÞ  pXu ðtÞXuðtÞ  pmðtÞmðtÞ: (7)
Assets A(t) provide a return r (the return on capital), increase with income Y(t) and
decrease with purchases in the market of healthy consumption goods XhðtÞ, unhealthy
consumption goods XuðtÞ and medical care m(t), at prices pXh ðtÞ, pXu ðtÞ and pm(t),
respectively. We have a fixed initial A(0) = A0 and a fixed end condition A(T) = AT for
wealth, and assume that individuals face no borrowing constraints.10
Income Y(t)  Y[H(t), z(t); E, x(t)] is assumed to be an increasing function of
health H(t) (@Y/@H > 0) and of job-related health stress z(t) (@Y/@z > 0; Case and
Deaton, 2005). We follow Grossman (1972a,b, 2000) and model income Y(t) as the
product of the wage rate w(t) and time spent working sw(t):
Y ½H ðtÞ  wðtÞ X LðtÞ  smðtÞ  sCh ðtÞ  sCu ðtÞ  s½H ðtÞf g: (8)
Individuals receive wages w(t)w[t, z(t); E, x(t)], which are a function of job-related
health stress z(t):
8 We follow Grossman (1972a,b) in distinguishing between the production of health I[m(t), sm(t); E] and
the deterioration of health d(t) and in allowing the deterioration rate d(t) to be a function of health H(t). We
follow Case and Deaton (2005) in modelling health behaviours as operating through the deterioration rate
d(t). These choices are somewhat arbitrary. Mathematically, however, they are equivalent, with the exception
that with our current choice, investment is not a direct function of health or health behaviour since the
production process does not explicitly depend on them.
9 In Grossman’s original formulation (Grossman, 1972a,b) length of life T is determined by a minimum
health level Hmin below which life cannot be sustained. If health reaches this level H(t) = Hmin an individual
dies, hence H(T)  Hmin.
10 Imperfect capital markets itself could be a cause of socio-economic disparities in health if low income
individuals face greater borrowing constraints and therefore cannot optimally invest in health.
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wðtÞ ¼ wðtÞ½1þ zðtÞcw ; (9)
where cw  0 and w*(t)  w*[E, x(t)] represents the ‘stressless’ wage rate, i.e. the wage
rate associated with the least job-related health stress z(t) = 0.11 The stressless wage
rate w*(t) is a function of the consumer’s education E and experience x(t) (Mincer,
1974):
wðtÞ ¼ wEeqEEþbxxðtÞbx2 xðtÞ
2
; (10)
where education E is expressed in years of schooling, x(t) is years of working
experience and qE, bx and bx2 are coefficients, assumed to be positive.
Thus, we have the following optimal control problem: the objective function (1) is
maximised with respect to the control functions L(t), XhðtÞ, sCh ðtÞ, XuðtÞ, sCu ðtÞ, m(t),
sm(t), z(t), the parameter T and subject to the constraints (4), (6) and (7).
The Hamiltonian (Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987) of this problem is as follows:
= ¼ U ðtÞebt þ qH ðtÞ @H ðtÞ
@t
þ qAðtÞ @AðtÞ
@t
; (11)
where qH(t) is the marginal value of remaining life-time utility (from t onward) derived
from additional health capital:
qH ðtÞ ¼ @
@H ðtÞ
Z T 
t
U ðÞebsds; (12)
and qA(t) is the marginal value of remaining life-time utility derived from additional
financial capital:
qAðtÞ ¼ @
@AðtÞ
Z T 
t
U ðÞebsds; (13)
T  denotes optimal length of life, and U(*) denotes the maximised utility function
(Caputo, 2005).
The condition for optimal longevity T follows from the dynamic envelope theorem
(Caputo, 2005):
@
@T
Z T 
t
U ðÞebsds ¼ @
@T
Z T
0
=ðtÞdt ¼ =ðT Þ ¼ 0: (14)
The marginal value of life extension is given by =ðT Þ ¼ U ðT ÞebT þ
qH ðT Þ@H ðtÞ=@tjt¼T þ qAðT Þ@AðtÞ=@tjt¼T . When dividing by the marginal value of
wealth, one obtains a measure for the monetary value of life, =ðT Þ=qAðT Þ ¼
U ðT Þ=UC ðT Þ þ qh=aðT Þ@H ðtÞ=@tjt¼T þ @AðtÞ=@tjt¼T . The monetary value of life is
similar to the expressions obtained in Rosen (1988) (his equation (16)) and Murphy
and Topel (2006) (their equations (7) and (8)), for health-neutral consumption. Our
measure is richer since it additionally takes into account asset accumulation and health
depreciation.
11 We associate z(t) = 0 with the least amount of job-related health stress possible in employment, and
since there is no obvious scale to job stress we employ the simple relationship shown in (9).
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2.2. First-order Conditions
In this subsection, we discuss the first-order conditions for optimisation. We assume
that an interior solution to the optimisation problem exists. Detailed derivations are
provided in online Appendix A. The first-order condition for health investment is
given by
qh=aðtÞ ¼ pI ðtÞ; (15)
where qh/a(t) represents the marginal benefit of health investment, defined as the ratio
of the marginal value of health, qH(t), to the marginal value of wealth, qA(t)
(throughout the article, we refer to qh/a(t) as the relative marginal value of health):
qh=aðtÞ  qH ðtÞqAðtÞ ; (16)
and pI(t) represents the marginal cost of health investment:
pI ðtÞ  pmðtÞ
@I=@m
¼ wðtÞ
@I=@sm
: (17)
The marginal benefit of health investment increases in the marginal value of health
qH(t) and decreases in the marginal value of wealth qA(t). If the marginal value of
health is high individuals invest more in health, and if the marginal value of wealth is
high individuals invest less, consume less and save more.
For the functional form (5), we can express the marginal cost of health investment
pI(t) as follows (see online Appendix B for detail):
pI ðtÞ ¼ pmðtÞ
1bI wðtÞbI
lI ðt;EÞa1bII bbII
mðtÞ1aIbI ; (18)
pI ðtÞ ¼ pmðtÞ
aI wðtÞ1aI
lI ðt;EÞaaII b1aII
smðtÞ1aIbI : (19)
The marginal cost of health investment pI(t) increases with the level of health
investment goods and services m(t) and time inputs sm(t) due to decreasing returns to
scale 0\ aI þ bI \ 1,12 with the price of medical goods and services purchased in the
market pm(t) and with the opportunity cost of time w(t), where the latter is a function
of job-related health stress, z(t).
The first-order condition for leisure is
@U
@L
¼ qAð0ÞwðtÞeðbr Þt ; (20)
a standard result equating the marginal utility of leisure @U/@L to the marginal cost of
leisure, which is a function of the marginal value of initial wealth qA(0), the individual’s
12 Intuitively, at higher levels of investment, due to concavity of the health-production function I[m(t),
sm(t); E], an additional increment of investment m(t), sm(t) produces a smaller improvement in health. Thus,
the effective ‘price’ pI(t) increases with the level of investment m(t), sm(t).
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wage rate w(t), and the difference between the time preference rate b and the return
on capital r.
The first-order condition for healthy consumption is
@U
@Ch
¼ qAð0Þ pCh ðtÞ  udCh ðtÞ
 
eðbr Þt ; (21)
where pCh ðtÞ  pCh ½t; ChðtÞ; zðtÞ; E ; xðtÞ is the marginal monetary cost of healthy
consumption ChðtÞ:
pCh ðtÞ 
pXh ðtÞ
@Ch=@Xh
¼ wðtÞ
@Ch=@sCh
; (22)
and udCh ðtÞ  udCh ½t; H ðtÞ; ChðtÞ; CuðtÞ; zðtÞ; E ; xðtÞ; nðtÞ is the marginal health
benefit of healthy consumption:
udCh ðtÞ  qh=aðtÞ
@d
@Ch
: (23)
The marginal monetary cost of healthy consumption pCh ðtÞ (see (22)) is a function
of the price of healthy consumption goods and services pXh ðtÞ and the opportunity cost
of time w(t), and represents the direct monetary cost of consumption. The marginal
health benefit of healthy consumption udCh ðtÞ (see (23)), is equal to the product of the
relative marginal value of health qh/a(t) and the ‘amount’ of health saved @d=@Ch, and
represents the marginal value of health saved.
Similarly, the first-order condition for unhealthy consumption is
@U
@Cu
¼ qAð0Þ pCu ðtÞ þ pdCu ðtÞ½ eðbrÞt ; (24)
where pCu ðtÞ  pCu ½t; CuðtÞ; zðtÞ; E ; xðtÞ is the marginal monetary cost of unhealthy
consumption CuðtÞ (direct monetary cost):
pCu ðtÞ 
pXu ðtÞ
@Cu=@Xu
¼ wðtÞ
@Cu=@sCu
; (25)
and pdCu ðtÞ  pdCu ½t; H ðtÞ; ChðtÞ; CuðtÞ; zðtÞ; E ; xðtÞ; nðtÞ is the marginal health cost
of unhealthy consumption (marginal value of health lost):
pdCu ðtÞ  qh=aðtÞ
@d
@Cu
: (26)
The first-order condition for unhealthy consumption (24) is similar to the condition
for healthy consumption (21). The difference lies in the marginal health cost (rather
than health benefit) of unhealthy consumption, which has to be added rather than
subtracted from the marginal monetary cost of unhealthy consumption pCu ðtÞ.
Last, the first-order condition for job-related health stress is
uzðtÞ ¼ pdzðtÞ; (27)
where φz(t)φz[t, H(t), z(t); E, x(t)] is the marginal production benefit of job-related
health stress:
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uzðtÞ 
@Y
@z
; (28)
reflecting the notion that job-related health stress is associated with a compensating
wage differential (greater earnings), and pdzðtÞ  pdz½t; H ðtÞ; ChðtÞ; CuðtÞ; zðtÞ;
E ; xðtÞ; nðtÞ is the marginal health cost of job-related health stress (marginal value
of health lost):
pdzðtÞ  qh=aðtÞ
@d
@z
: (29)
2.3. The Health Cost and Health Benefit of Health Behaviour
From the first-order conditions follow that lifestyle decisions regarding consumption
and occupation provide utility (directly or indirectly), and are associated with a
monetary cost and with an opportunity cost. However, in contrast to conventional
economic models, in our theory, these lifestyle decisions are additionally associated
with a ‘health benefit’ or a ‘health cost’. The health cost (benefit) is given by
qh=aðtÞ @d
@x
; (30)
where the variable x represents the relevant health behaviour (e.g. unhealthy
consumption or hard physical labour), and the definition of qh/a(t) is given by (12),
(13), and (16). From (16), (43) and (44) follows:
qh=aðtÞ ¼ qh=aðT Þe
R T
t
rþ @d@H½ dx
þ
Z T
t
e

R s
t
rþ @d@H½ dx 1
qAð0Þ
@U
@H
eðbr Þs þ @Y
@H
 
ds:
(31)
The health cost (benefit) is the amount of health ‘lost’ (‘saved’) due to the health
behaviour @d/@x times the relative marginal value of health qh/a(t) (the ‘price’ or
‘value’ of health, measured in life-time monetary units (e.g. US dollars) per unit of
health, see (31)). In simple terms, unhealthy consumption worsens health, and the
health cost is the value one attaches to the lifetime consequences of reduced health.
These life-time consequences consist of the discounted additional (marginal) utility
(qA(0)
1@U/@He(br)s in (31)) plus the additional earnings (production benefit)
derived from better health (@Y/@H in (31)), over the remainder of life (from t till T).
They are discounted at the rate r + @d/@H, where @d/@H represents the cost of
holding the stock of health and r represents the opportunity cost (i.e. one could
alternatively invest in assets).
There are assymetries between health costs and health benefits. For healthy
consumption, the time investments and monetary costs are incurred today (and so is
utility, if any, from its consumption), while the health benefits are reaped in the future.
For unhealthy consumption, the opposite holds: it provides pleasure (and requires
time investments and monetary costs) today, while the health costs occur in the future.
This implies that discount rates matter, as well as information on the healthiness or
unhealthiness of the good @d/@x. Individuals who discount the future heavily (large b
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in (31)) or who underestimate the health consequences, will engage more in unhealthy
consumption. Likewise, individuals who discount the future or underestimate the health
gains from healthy consumption will engage less in healthy consumption.
Assessments of the value of a statistical life (VSL) (see Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, for a
review) generally involve investigating the risk of death that people are willing to take
(usually in a setting of hazardous work) and how much they should be paid for taking
these risks. An analogous concept is captured in, e.g. the first-order condition for job-
related health stress (27), which weighs the wage premium of engaging in unhealthy/
risky jobs today with the costs in terms of the lifetime consequences of reduced health
(and associated longevity). In our theory, individuals are also willing to engage in a
certain amount of unhealthy consumption for the utility it provides, as long as this
benefit outweighs the associated health cost: the reduction in life-time utility due to
health loss associated with unhealthy consumption. Thus, our theory provides a
framework for determining the value of life and the value of health in settings outside
of hazardous work, e.g. by exploiting unhealthy behaviours.
As we discuss in the remainder of the article, the health cost and health benefit of
behaviour are promising concepts for understanding a wide range of health
behaviours, as well as the socio-economic disparities in these behaviours.
2.4. Assumptions
Apart from the earlier mentioned assumptions of diminishing returns to scale (DRTS)
of investment m(t), sm(t), in the health-production function I[m(t), sm(t); E]
(0\ aI þ bI \ 1), and diminishing marginal utilities of healthy ChðtÞ and unhealthy
consumption CuðtÞ, of leisure L(t) and of health H(t), we further assume:
1. Diminishing marginal production benefit of health @2Y/@H2 < 0, diminish-
ing marginal production benefit of job-related health stress @2Y/@z2 < 0,
diminishing marginal health benefit of healthy consumption @2d=@C2h [ 0,
and diminishing returns to longevity (see (14)):
@=ðT Þ
@T
¼ @
2
@T 2
Z T 
t
U ðÞebsds\0; (32)
where T  denotes optimal length of life and U(*) denotes the maximised
utility function (Caputo, 2005).
2. Increasing or constant returns to scale in the marginal health cost of
unhealthy consumption @2d=@C2u  0 (Forster, 2001)13 and in the marginal
health cost of job-related health stress @2d/@z2 ≥ 0.
3. Cobb–Douglas CRTS relations between the inputs (goods/services purchased
in the market and own-time) and the outputs healthy consumption ChðtÞ,
and unhealthy consumption CuðtÞ: ChðtÞ ¼ lCh ðtÞXhðtÞjCh sCh ðtÞ1jCh and
13 While it seems plausible that the health benefits of health investment and healthy consumption exhibit
diminishing returns to scale, the health costs of unhealthy consumption and job-related health stress
plausibly exhibit increasing returns to scale. In simple terms: whereas after a certain point more health
investment, exercise or consumption of healthy foods, does not prevent eventual ageing, escalating risky
behaviour (e.g. illicit drug use) or dangerous work can lead to rapid health deterioration.
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CuðtÞ ¼ lCu ðtÞXuðtÞjCu sCu ðtÞ1jCu , where jCh , jCu are the elasticities of the
outputs with respect to goods and services and 1  jCh , 1  jCu are the
elasticities of the outputs with respect to time inputs. As a result, we have (see
(22) and (25)):
pCh ðtÞ ¼
pCh ðtÞjCh wðtÞ1jCh
j
jCh
Ch
ð1 jCh Þ1jCh lCh ðtÞ
; (33)
pCu ðtÞ ¼
pCu ðtÞjCu wðtÞ1jCu
jjCuCu ð1 jCu Þ
1jCu lCu ðtÞ
: (34)
4. First-order direct effects dominate higher-order indirect effects for control
variables. For example, wealth affects healthy consumption directly, but also
indirectly through its effect on unhealthy consumption, since unhealthy
consumption affects healthy consumption through its effect on utility and on
health deterioration. The assumption, in this particular example, is that the
direct effect of wealth on healthy consumption dominates any indirect wealth
effect that operates through unhealthy consumption or through any other
control variable.
Second and higher-order terms are often ignored since they tend to be
quantitatively less important (e.g. first-order Taylor series approximations).
Moreover, additively separable utility functions are fairly conventional in the
literature (Zeckhauser, 1970; Gjerde et al., 2005; Hall and Jones, 2007) and
assuming that utility is additively separable and that the health deterioration
rate is additively separable, would lead to similar results. The difference is
that we require second-order terms to be small, not that they are identical to
zero and we do not make the assumption for state variables since small
differences can grow large over time. Thus, e.g. the marginal utility of healthy
consumption is still a function of health (Finkelstein et al., 2013). Therefore,
our assumption is less restrictive than the fairly conventional assumption of
functions being additively separable in their arguments. We provide more
detail in online Appendix D.
In addition to these four assumptions, we need further information to be able to
conduct the comparative dynamic analyses (Section 4). In particular, we need the sign
of @d/@H, @qA(t)/@A(t) and @qA(t)/@H(t). For this reason, in the next Section, we
calibrate a simple version of the model to establish which signs are plausible. We obtain
these as our ‘benchmark’ relationships. From the calibrated model, we have:
(i) @d/@H > 0;
(ii) @qA(t)/@A(t) < 0; @qA(t)/@wE < 0; @qA(t)/@E < 0; and
(iii) @qA(t)/@H(t) < 0.
The calibrated model suggests that health increases aging at a diminishing rate, i.e.
@d/@H ≥ 0 and @2d/@H2 ≤ 0. This suggests that the health of healthy individuals
deteriorates faster in absolute terms (since they have more of it) but not in relative
terms (as a percentage of total health). Further, the calibrated model suggests
diminishing returns to wealth @qAðtÞ=@AðtÞ ¼ @2½
R T 
t U ðÞebsds=@AðtÞ2\ 0, i.e.
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poorer individuals derive greater benefits from an additional increment of wealth than
wealthier individuals. Finally, the calibrated model suggests unhealthier individuals
derive greater benefits from an additional increment of wealth (@qAðtÞ=@H ðtÞ ¼
@2½R T t U ðÞebsds=@AðtÞ@H ðtÞ\ 0).14 This suggests health and wealth are to some
extent substitutable in financing consumption and leisure (Muurinen, 1982; Case and
Deaton, 2005).15
In online Appendix C, we also explicitly investigate the sensitivity of our predictions
to the opposite signs of the above relations to assess the robustness of our results.
3. Dynamics and Numerical Calibration
In this Section, we begin with a study of the life-cycle profiles of health and health
investment. Theoretically, the model’s predictions for these life-cycle patterns are
ambiguous. We therefore calibrate a simple version of the model to investigate whether
for a realistic set of parameter values it is able to reproduce empirical stylised facts. We
then use findings from the calibrated simulations to make predictions for the life-cycle
trajectories of healthy and unhealthy consumption and job-related health stress.
3.1. Health Investment and Health over the Life Cycle
A quick glance at the first-order conditions in subsection 2.2 shows that the relative
marginal value of health qh/a(t) is an important driver of health investment (and more
generally of health behaviour). Specifically, note that from (15), (18) and (19) we
obtain
mðtÞ / qh=aðtÞ1=ð1aIbI Þ; (35)
smðtÞ / qh=aðtÞ1=ð1aIbI Þ: (36)
Thus, health investment increases with the marginal value of health. Hence, to
understand health investment we first investigate the dynamics of the relative marginal
value of health qh/a(t) and of health H(t). We then discuss the implications of these
dynamic patterns for health behaviours.16
Individuals start life generally in good health at H(0) = H0, while the terminal health
stock H(T) is constrained to the minimum health level Hmin, below which life cannot
be sustained. This implies that health decreases over the life cycle. Indeed, empirical
evidence suggests that health falls over the life cycle, first slowly and then more rapidly
in old age (Deaton and Paxson, 1998; Van Kippersluis et al., 2009; Dalgaard and
Strulik, 2014).
14 Where T  denotes optimal length of life and U(*) denotes the maximised utility function (see (13)).
15 Intuitively, health is a resource and having more of it relaxes the dynamic constraint for wealth: being in
better health reduces the need for health investment and health provides earnings. Both health and wealth
are resources that enable consumption and leisure.
16 After solving the optimal control problem, the model’s solutions can be fully expressed in the state and
co-state functions. For this reason, it is useful to start with an analysis of the dynamics of the co-state function
qh/a(t) and the state function H(t).
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The evolution of the relative marginal value of health qh/a(t) is given by
@qh=aðtÞ
@t
¼ qh=aðtÞ r þ @d
@H
 
 1
qAð0Þ
@U
@H
eðbr Þt  @Y
@H
(37)
(combine equations (43) and (44) of online Appendix A). Recall that the relative
marginal value of health qh/a(t) is the ratio of the marginal value of health qH(t) and
the marginal value of wealth qA(t). The marginal value of wealth depreciates with age
at the rate of return on capital r (see (43)). The marginal value of health qH(t),
however, may increase or decrease with age. As long as qH(t) appreciates, or
depreciates more slowly than qA(t), the relative marginal value of health qh/a(t) will
increase with age.
Empirical evidence suggests that health investments increase with age: medical
expenditures peak in the final phase of life (Zweifel et al., 1999),17 and other
components of health investment either increase or stay relatively flat with age (Podor
and Halliday, 2012). This suggests that the relative marginal value of health increases
with age (see (15)).
Theoretically, our model allows for these patterns but does not unambiguously
predict them. In the next subsection, therefore, we resort to calibrated simulations to
investigate whether our model, for a realistic set of parameter values, is able to
reproduce these empirical stylised facts.
3.2. Calibrated Simulations
Our calibrated simulations proceed in several steps. First, we compute five-year
averages for a health index and for health investment and treat these as the data
‘moments’ for our calibration. Following Poterba et al. (2011, 2013), we construct a
health index using 1999–2013 US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data of a
rich set of health measures, including:
(i) a binary indicator of poor self-reported health;
(ii) diseases such as acute myocardial infarctions (AMI), arthritis, asthma, cancer,
diabetes, heart conditions, high blood pressure, learning disorders, lung
disease and stroke;
(iii) mental health problems;
(iv) activities of daily living (ADLs); and
(v) body-mass index (BMI).
We arbitrarily scale this health index such that initial health is equal to 100 and health
at age 80 is equal to 15. We obtained age profiles for health investment from Halliday
et al. (2017) who computed health investment expenditures from the US Medical
Expenditure Survey (MEPS). Figure 1 shows the life-cycle patterns of health and health
investment, where the dots indicate the average of the health index and of health
investment in five year age groups. As the figure shows, health declines in a concave
17 DeNardi et al. (2016) decompose medical expenditures into different components, and show that the
rapidly increasing expenditures in old age can largely be attributed to long-term and nursing home care.
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manner over the life cycle, while health investment increases rapidly in old age. These
are stylised facts our model of health production ought to reproduce.
Second, we estimate the hourly wage profile using the PSID data and a Mincer
equation of log hourly wages on dummies for each educational level and a quadratic
polynomial in age. The estimated parameters are as follows:
wt ¼ e2:3366þ0:3731Dþ0:0314t0:0006t2 ; (38)
where D is a dummy for a college degree, t measures age and we multiply by two to
obtain the yearly wages in thousands of dollars (assuming individuals work for
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Fig. 1. Model Simulation of Health (Top Part) and Health Investment (Bottom Part), Using Calibrated
Parameter Values in Table 1
Notes. The solid lines indicate the model simulations and the dots indicate the empirical data
moments constructed from PSID (health) and MEPS (health investment). Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
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40 hours, 50 weeks per year). This Mincer-type wage equation for a college graduate
starts with annual wages of $30,000 per year at age t = 20 and peaks at $45,000 per year
at age t = 50 after which wages gradually decline.
Third, we numerically simulate a simplified version of our model (see online
Appendix C for details). Since the aim is to investigate whether our model is capable of
reproducing the stylised facts regarding the life-cycle profiles of health and health
investment, we omit the time inputs into consumption and health investment, omit the
distinction between healthy and unhealthy consumption, and omit job-related health
stress.
We assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function with scale
parameter lU of the form:
U ½Ht ;Ct  ¼ 1
1 q lU C
f
t H
1f
t
 1qþB; (39)
where 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 is the relative ‘share’ of consumption versus health, q is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion and B is a constant to ensure that utility is positive (Hall and
Jones, 2007). We follow Scholz and Seshadri (2016) in modelling sick time as
s½Ht  ¼ Hct , and use a flexible functional form for health production:
Htþ1 Ht ¼ lI mat  dt H mt ; (40)
where 0 < a < 1, and dt ¼ eaþbt following Cropper (1981) and Wagstaff (1986a). This
functional form is flexible enough to capture various possible relationships between
the deterioration rate (dt ¼ dt H mt ) and health. For example, m = 1 represents the
Grossman case, while m < 0 is akin to the health-deficit model by Dalgaard and Strulik
(2014), in which the health of unhealthy individuals deteriorates faster. The functional
form also depends in a flexible way on calendar age t.
No consensus exists over what causes ageing with many theories attempting to explain
what drives it. Two important classes of theories are prominent. The first class consists of
‘deficit-based theories’, where ageing occurs predominantly as a result of the accumu-
lation of deficits (or ‘damage’). For example, Arking (2006) advocates a theory of ageing
in which health decline is independent of calendar age, depending solely on the level of
health, i.e. as in amodel of ageing due to wear and tear (Dalgaard and Strulik, 2014). The
second class consists of ‘programmed theories of ageing’, where ageing is predominantly
the result of genetically regulated or predetermined processes (De Magalhaes, 2003,
2011, 2014; Longo et al., 2005). Such processes exhibit ‘pure’ calendar age effects. De
Magalhaes (2011) writes for example: ‘. . . it is now largely recognised that ageing (. . .) is
not primarily the result of damage to irreplaceable body parts (p. 34)’ and that there is a
role for ‘. . . genetically regulated processes or predetermined mechanisms (p. 38)’ (De
Magalhaes, 2011). Further, Longo et al. (2005) provide evidence for genetic program-
ming ‘that regulates the level of protection against stochastic damage, and therefore the
length of time an organism remains healthy’ (p. 866). Finally, the so-called ageing-clock
theory, which also falls within the programmed theories, stipulates that ‘Aging is
programmed into our bodies, like a clock ticking away from the moment of conception
(p. 61)’ (Moody and Sasser, 2014). The two classes of theories are not mutually exclusive;
and there is in fact wide recognition that ageing exhibits genetic programming or
predetermined, and accumulated deficits aspects, with disagreement about their relative
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importance. We therefore choose to remain agnostic about the ageing process, using a
specification dt ¼ dt H mt that is flexible enough to encompass both deficits as well as
calendar age aspects of ageing. In essence, we ask the data which aspects of ageing are
important in our model for a good fit. We find that both calendar age and deficits
features are needed.
Fourth, we fix a large number of model parameters by taking values from the
literature (see Table 1 in online Appendix C). In particular, we set a = 0.75 in line with
Hugonnier et al. (2013, 2016) who use values of 0.69 and 0.77, respectively. We follow
Scholz and Seshadri (2016), setting A0 = AT = 0, q = 3, f = 0.7 and c = 1.7.
18 We follow
Blau (2008) and DeNardi et al. (2016), setting the time preference rate b = 0.03, and
the interest rate r equal to b. We further normalise prices of consumption and health
investment and the efficiency of consumption to one. The remaining parameters to be
calibrated are m, lI, lU, and the parameters a and b of the deterioration rate dt .
Given the data moments and our model solutions, we calibrate the parameters m, lI,
lU, a and b using a method of simulated moments (MSM) approach (see online
Appendix C for details). Admittedly, this parameter space leaves many degrees of
freedom. We do not claim our parametrisation is unique. See, for example, Dalgaard
and Strulik (2014) for an alternative framework using health deficits that is also able to
reproduce the life-cycle profiles for health and health investment. Our aim is more
modest: to illustrate that for a realistic set of parameter values the model can
reproduce the empirical stylised facts. Table 1 in online Appendix C provides the fixed
and calibrated parameter values, and Figure 1 shows the resulting simulated profiles
(solid lines) alongside the empirical moments (dots). For this realistic set of parameter
values, the fit of our simulated profiles is fairly accurate. The model can generate
empirically plausible trajectories.19
The calibrated simulations provide three additional pieces of information. First, the
calibrated simulations suggest an optimal length of life of T = 76.8 years.
Second, our calibration establishes a benchmark for the sign of relationships we
require to obtain comparative dynamic results. The parameter value m = 0.3 in (40) is
consistent with @d/@H ≥ 0 and @2d/@H2 ≤ 0. Further, in counterfactual simulations
where we increase A0 and H0 by a small amount, we obtain @qA(0)/@A0 < 0 and
@qA(0)/@H0 < 0 (see Table 2 in online Appendix C).
Third, the calibrated model demonstrates that while health declines, the relative
marginal value of health increases, with age. We will use these life-cycle patterns to
derive from theory the implied life-cycle profiles for healthy and unhealthy consump-
tion and job-related health stress in the general model.
18 Scholz and Seshadri (2016) use c = 0.17, we multiply with 10 to account for the difference in scaling
between their and our health variable.
19 The calibration suggests that a model where health depreciation depends only implicitly on age
through the health stock H(t), i.e. dt H
m
t ¼ d0H mt and m < 0 is able to fit the health profile very accurately.
However, this model cannot reproduce the quasi-exponentially increasing profile for health investment. Our
understanding from the calibration exercise is that there are two different ways in which one can reproduce
the empirical life-cycle profiles of health and health investment:
(i) a Grossman-style health accumulation model with health depreciation that depends explicitly on
age as well as implicitly on the health stock, e.g., dt H
m
t , with 0 < m < 1; and
(ii) a health-deficit model in the style of Dalgaard and Strulik (2014).
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3.3. Health Behaviour over the Life-cycle
As illustrated by the calibrated simulations, for plausible parameter values, the relative
marginal value of health qh/a(t) increases with age. This would suggest that the health
cost of unhealthy consumption and of job-related health stress and the health benefit
of healthy consumption increase with age.20 Smoking rates are 8.9% among the 65+
compared to 21.6% among the 25–44 (US DHHS, 2014), and intake of fruit and
vegetables increases with age (Serdula et al., 2004; Pearson et al., 2005). These patterns
are consistent with the notion that the health benefit of healthy behaviour and the
health cost of unhealthy behaviour increase with age: individuals start caring more
about their health when they get older.
With declining health H(t) and an increasing marginal value of health qh/a(t) with
age, we obtain the following life-cycle patterns for health behaviours. Early in life,
individuals are generally healthy and, therefore, plausibly value health less (see Table 2
in online Appendix C and Propositions 5 and 7, subsection 4.3). As a result, they invest
less in their health (see (15)), engage more in unhealthy consumption (see (24)), and
less in healthy consumption (see (21)). As individuals age, declining health becomes a
burden as poor health reduces utility and increased sick time reduces earnings. As a
result, the benefits of health increase and individuals invest more in health, shift
toward healthier consumption and reduce the level of job-related health stress. This
general trend of improved health behaviour may be partially reversed in mid-life, as
wages peak, leading to a higher opportunity cost of time. This may result in a reduction
in health investment and healthy consumption in mid-life, relative to a general trend of
improved health behaviours with age.
The pattern for job stress is distinct. Early in life the health cost of job stress qh/a(t)
@d/@z] is low, but so is the marginal benefit of job stress @Y/@z (see (27)). As wages
increase, the benefit of job-stress increases. After mid-age, declining health reduces the
marginal benefit of job-stress, as sick time reduces the time available for work and
wages plateau or even decrease. This suggests a pattern in which job stress initially
increases as the marginal benefit of job-stress increases due to wage growth, followed by
a decline in job stress due to plateauing or declining wages, increasing sick time and an
increasing health cost of job stress with age.
PREDICTION 1. Individuals in mid-life plausibly accept unhealthy working conditions as they
value the associated wage premium, but as they age they seek to engage in healthier work.
4. Variation in Health Behaviour by SES and Health
Comparative dynamic analyses allow exploration of the effect of SES and health on the
life-cycle trajectories of the control and state variables. We investigate the change in the
optimal trajectory in response to variation in initial conditions or other model
20 However, it is unclear whether @d/@x, for x ¼ Ch ;Cu ; z increases or decreases with age. Since health
decreases with age, and since @d/@H > 0 (since m > 0 in our calibrated simulations), a declining health stock
decreases the ageing rate d(t) with age. Depending on the sign of @2d=@H@Ch , @2d=@H@Cu , and @
2d/@H@z,
this effect may be either reinforced or mitigated. As outlined in Assumption 4, we assume these second-order
effects are quantitatively less important.
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parameters, by comparing the ‘perturbed’ optimal trajectory with respect to the
‘unperturbed’ (or original) trajectory. Comparative dynamic analysis is an alternative
to numerical simulation that has the benefit of being less restrictive by allowing for
quite general functional forms (i.e. that utility be concave rather than, e.g. CRRA).
Moreover, as Dalgaard and Strulik (2015, p. 2) put it: ‘A purely numerical analysis
entails a danger of neglecting general properties and implications of the model’.
Our emphasis is on exploring differences in constraints related to SES and health.21
Common measures of SES employed in empirical research are wealth, earnings
(income) and education. Here, we provide an intuitive discussion of the comparative
dynamic results, supported by a number of propositions, whose formal proof we
relegate to online Appendix D.
The effect of variation in an initial condition or other model parameter dZ, where we
are particulary interested in Z = {A0, wE, E, H0}, on any control or state variable g(t)
can be separated into two components:22
@g ðtÞ
@Z
¼ @g ðtÞ
@Z

T
þ @g ðtÞ
@T

Z
@T
@Z
; (41)
where the first term on the right-hand side (RHS) represents the response to variation
in Z for constant T and the second term on the RHS represents the additional
response due to the associated variation in T.
4.1. Variation in Initial Wealth, dA0
Let us focus first on the hypothetical case where length of life T is fixed. Contrasting
the fixed T case with the general case where T is free provides us with useful insights
regarding the properties of the model. This scenario may represent a developing
nation with a high disease burden (where there may be lack of access to medical or
public health technology, and competing risks from many diseases), the developed
world, if it were faced with diminishing ability to further extend life or individuals with
a disease that severely limits longevity, such as Huntington’s disease (Oster et al., 2013).
PROPOSITION 1. Absent ability to extend life, wealthy individuals, ceteris paribus, value
health only marginally more than less wealthy individuals.
For proof, see online Appendix D.1.
For fixed length of life T, additional wealth dA0 increases the relative marginal value of
health initially, @qh=aðtÞ=@A0jT [ 0 but eventually the relative marginal value of wealth
decreases with respect to the unperturbed path, @qh=aðtÞ=@A0jT \ 0. This result is
illustrated in Figure 2, where the thick solid line labelled ‘Unperturbed’ represents the
21 Part of the SES-health gradient may be explained by differences in individual’s preferences. A lower rate
of time preference b operates in a similar manner to wealth, earnings and education. A lower rate of time
preference may also lead to greater investment in education (not part of our theory), and hence lead to joint
determination of health and education (Fuchs, 1986).
22 Note that we can restart the problem at any time t, taking A(t) and H(t) as the new initial conditions.
Thus the comparative dynamic results derived for, e.g. variation in initial wealth dA0 and initial health dH0
have greater validity, applying to variation in wealth dA(t) and in health dH(t) at any time t 2 [0, T).
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unperturbed trajectory of the relative marginal value of health qh/a(t) versus age t and
the dotted line labelled ‘T fixed’ represents the perturbed path for fixed T. Note that
both curves end at t = T. The intuition is that the relative marginal value of health
cannot be higher at all times, as this would be associated with higher health
investment, improved health behaviour (see the first-order conditions in subsection
2.2), and a longer life, violating the condition that end of life occurs at t = T (fixed) at
the minimum health level H(T) = Hmin. Indeed, simulations confirm this pattern: in
the calibrated model, for individuals with higher initial wealth, the marginal value of
health is higher up to age 70 and lower thereafter.23 The response to additional wealth
is thus muted as the individual is forced to invest less later in life in order not to extend
life. Hence, the first term on the RHS of (41) is small for variation in wealth A0.
Let us now turn to the more interesting case where individuals can optimally choose
T; they not only invest in the quality of life but also in the quantity of life.
Individuals optimally choose longevity T such that the marginal value of life
extension is zero at this age, =ðT Þ ¼ 0 (see (14)):
=ðT Þ
qAðT Þ ¼
1
qAð0ÞU ðT Þe
ðbrÞT þ qh=aðT Þ @H
@t

t¼T
þ @A
@t

t¼T
¼ 0; (42)
where for reasons of exposition we have divided by qA(T). As (42) shows, the marginal
benefit of extending life consists of the additional utility from consumption and
health. The marginal costs consist of the increasingly binding wealth and health
Unperturbed
T TI TII
T fixed
II
I
qh/a (t)
Fig. 2. Evolution of the Relative Marginal Value of Health qh/a(t) with Age Due to Variation in A0
Notes. The solid thick line, labelled ‘Unperturbed’, represents the unperturbed path. The
perturbed paths are shown for the T fixed case (dotted line, labelled ‘T fixed’), scenario I,
associated with small life extension TI (dotted line, labelled ‘I’) and scenario II, associated with
large life extension TII (dotted line labelled ‘II’).
23 Note that it can be understood that the opposite pattern, one of disinvestment early in life and
increased investment later in life, is inferior as it would be associated with lower health at all ages and
therefore a reduced consumption benefit.
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constraints, due to declining wealth and declining health near the end of life.24 With
declining health, the utility U(t) gained over the extra years decreases, and thereby the
marginal benefit of life extension. The calibrated simulation shows that qh/a(t)
increases rapidly with age as health declines, suggesting that the marginal cost of life
extension does, too. Eventually, the depreciation of health and decumulation of assets
render additional life extension non-optimal.
As we will see, ability to extend life changes the picture dramatically as life extension
increases the return to health investment by increasing the period over which a
multitude of benefits of health can be accrued. The results can be summarised by
Propositions 2 and 3.
PROPOSITION 2. Wealthy individuals live longer: @T/@A0 > 0.
For proof, see online Appendix D.2.
PROPOSITION 3. Wealthy individuals value health more and are healthier at all ages. The
more life can be extended, the stronger is the increase in the value of health in response to
additional wealth.
For proof, see online Appendix D.3.
Intuitively, at high values of wealth (and hence consumption), individuals prefer
investing in health over consuming, since health extends life, the period over which
they can enjoy the benefits of health, leisure and consumption, whereas additional
consumption per period would yield only limited marginal utility due to diminishing
utility of consumption (Becker, 2007; Hall and Jones, 2007). With sufficient wealth,
one starts caring more about other goods, in particular health. Wealthier individuals
value health more relative to wealth, invest more, are healthier and live longer
(Propositions 2 and 3).
The second part of Proposition 3 is best understood by its visual representation in
Figure 2. The extent to which individuals are able to extend life, @T/@A0, depends on
the model’s parameters r, a, lI, etc. These parameters are in turn determined by
biology, medical technology and environmental factors. If these factors are
unfavourable to life extension (scenario I; small life extension), then individuals
value health more early in life, but value health less later in life (the perturbed path
starts higher, but eventually crosses the unperturbed path). This is the case we observe
in our calibrated simulations. The pattern of initially higher investment, and
subsequently lower investment, closely resembles that of the fixed T case (see
Proposition 1).
In contrast, if additional wealth affords considerable life extension (scenario II), the
relative marginal value of health is higher at all times. Life extension raises the return
to health investment and healthy behaviours. Further, utility from leisure and
consumption can be enjoyed with additional years of life. Health also generates
additional wealth from work, reinforcing the effect of the initial endowment of wealth
24 Both @H ðtÞ=@tjt¼T and @AðtÞ=@tjt¼T are negative since health approaches Hmin from above, and assets
decline near the end of life as poor health reduces earnings.
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dA0. Together, these various benefits substantially raise the value of health, leading to
improved health behaviours, better health throughout life and greater longevity. This
leads to the following prediction.
PREDICTION 2. Health disparities are larger in environments where the wealthy can effectively
use their resources to extend life.
Propositions 2 and 3 also allow gauging the predicted response of an increase in
wealth on health behaviours. A higher relative marginal value of health directly
increases the health benefit of healthy behaviour and the health cost of unhealthy
behaviour. Plausibly, this represents the dominant effect,25 consistent with wealthy
individuals behaving healthier (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010; Cutler et al., 2011;
Cawley and Ruhm, 2012) and consistent with less affluent individuals responding
more strongly to an unanticipated wealth shock (Van Kippersluis and Galama,
2014).
PREDICTION 3. Wealthy individuals shift consumption towards healthy consumption: they
consume more healthy and moderately unhealthy consumption goods and services but fewer
severely unhealthy consumption goods and services.
The comparative dynamic effect of wealth on healthy consumption can be
decomposed into a ‘direct’ and an ‘indirect’ wealth effect. The direct wealth effect
is positive: an increase in wealth affords more healthy consumption (see Table 2 in
online Appendix C). Yet, wealth also has an indirect effect: an increase in wealth leads
to a higher relative marginal value of health qh/a(t) (Proposition 3), which increases
the health benefit of healthy consumption ½qh=aðtÞ@d=@Ch . Both the direct and
indirect effects operate in the same direction, and wealthy individuals engage more in
healthy consumption: @ChðtÞ=@A0 [ 0, at least initially.26
Similar to healthy consumption, additional wealth enables purchases of more
unhealthy consumption goods – the direct wealth effect is positive. Yet, additional
wealth also increases the marginal health cost of unhealthy consumption qh=aðtÞ@d=@Cu
(the indirect wealth effect), through a higher relative marginal value of health qh/a(t).
The indirect wealth effect competes with the direct wealth effect.
While we cannot a priori sign the relation between unhealthy consumption and
wealth, the two competing effects predict an interesting pattern of behaviour. The
health cost increases in the severity of its impact on health, pdCuðtÞ / @d=@Cu (the
degree of ‘unhealthiness’ of the consumption good). This suggests that for moderately
unhealthy goods, the direct wealth effect would dominate, while for severely unhealthy
goods the indirect wealth effect would dominate.
25 An indirect effect operates through the effect that wealth has on health, and health in turn has on the
deterioration rate. It is not clear what the signs of these effects are, since signing these terms requires
assumptions on the signs of @d2=@H@Cu , @d2=@H@Ch , etc. As outlined in Assumption 4, we assume these
second-order effects are quantitatively less important. The effect of wealth on health is gradual and is
therefore at least initially unlikely to drive the effect of wealth on health behaviours.
26 If wealth enables limited life extension (scenario I in Proposition 3), it is possible that the health benefit
decreases late in life, since wealth reduces qh/a(t) late in life compared to the unperturbed path.
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4.2. Variation in Wages, dwE and Education dE
PROPOSITION 4. Permanently higher wages and education operate in a similar manner to an
increase in wealth dA0 (Propositions 1–3), with some differences:
(i) the wealth effect is muted by the increased opportunity cost of time;
(ii) permanent wages wE and education E also raise the production benefit of health; and
(iii) education raises the efficiency of health investment.
For proof, see online Appendix D.4.
It is important to distinguish between an evolutionary wage change and permanent
differences in the wage rate w(t), i.e. permanent income. In our model of perfect
certainty and perfect capital markets, an evolutionary increase in the wage rate w(t)
raises the opportunity cost of time but does not affect the marginal value of wealth
qA(t) (i.e. the life-cycle trajectory is unchanged). In contrast, if wages are permanently
higher, i.e. larger wE in (10), earnings are higher over the entire life cycle,
27 and in
addition to the opportunity cost of time effect, there is also a wealth effect (operating
by decreasing the marginal value of wealth qA(t); see Table 2 in online Appendix C).
Further, the production benefit of health is higher as higher wages increase the value
of health in reducing sick time.
There are reasons to believe that the wealth effect and the effect of a higher
production benefit of health dominate the opportunity cost of time effect. First, this is
consistent with the result by Dustmann and Windmeijer (2000) and Contoyannis et al.
(2004) that a permanent wage change affects health positively, while a transitory wage
increase affects health negatively. Second, it is consistent with the rich literature on
SES and health that consistently finds that high-income individuals are generally in
better health than low-income individuals.
Permanently higher wages due to education E (see (10)) are also associated with an
increased opportunity cost of time effect, a wealth effect and higher production
benefits. But, education also increases the efficiency lI(t; E) of health investment, as
the educated are assumed to be more efficient consumers and producers of health.
The efficiency effect of education has two implications. First, it increases total health
investment I[m(t), sm(t); E]. However, improved efficiency implies that fewer inputs
are required to obtain a certain level of investment, potentially reducing the market m
(t) and time inputs sm(t) devoted to health investment (Grossman, 1972a,b). Second, it
could potentially explain the stronger evidence for an effect of education on health
and the weaker evidence for effects of income and wealth on health, since the
efficiency effect does not operate for income and wealth (see Section 1). Thus, among
27 Earnings Y(t) are a function of the wage rate w(t) times the amount of time spent working sw(t) (see
(8)). A higher wage rate wE implies that the individual has higher earnings Y(t) because the direct effect of
higher wages is to increase earnings. There are also two secondary effects. First, individuals may work more
because of the higher opportunity cost of not working (substitution effect). Second, individuals may work
fewer hours to spend their increased income on leisure or consumption (income effect). Empirical studies
suggest that the substitution and income effects are of the same magnitude (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999),
and hence that the direct effect of a wage increase is to increase earnings, while the secondary effect is small,
consisting of two competing effects that roughly cancel out. Thus, a higher wage rate translates into higher
earnings.
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the socio-economic indicators, education improves health behaviours and health
potentially the most.
4.3. Variation in Initial Health, dH0
PROPOSITION 5. Absent ability to extend life, healthy individuals, ceteris paribus, value
health cumulatively less,
R T
0 ½@qh=aðtÞ=@H0jT dt\ 0.
For proof, see online Appendix D.5.
For fixed length of life T, when starting off with a higher level of health, cumulatively
the relative marginal value of health has to be lower over the life cycle, leading to
cumulatively unhealthier behaviour and lower health investment, in order to arrive at
Hmin over the same duration of life T. The calibrated model simulations confirm this
pattern and Figure 3 illustrates it: the perturbed fixed T path (dotted line) lies below
the unperturbed curve and both end at t = T.28
PROPOSITION 6. Healthy individuals live longer @T/@H0 ≥ 0.
For proof, see online Appendix D.6.
qh/a (t)
Unperturbed
T fixed
I
II
III
T TI TII TIII
Fig. 3. Evolution of the Relative Marginal Value of Health qh/a(t) with Age Due to Variation in H0
Notes. The solid thick line, labelled ‘Unperturbed’, represents the unperturbed path. The
perturbed paths are shown for the T fixed case (dotted line, labelled ‘T fixed’), scenario I,
associated with small life extension TI (dotted line, labelled ‘I’), scenario II, associated with
intermediate life extension TII (dotted line labelled ‘II’) and scenario III, associated with large
life extension (dotted line labelled ‘III’).
28 Cases are also possible where the relative marginal value of health is initially higher but eventually lower.
See online Appendix Section D.5 and Figure 9 for more details.
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PROPOSITION 7. Individuals with greater endowed health are healthier at all ages, @H(t)/
@H0 > 0, ∀t. For small life extension, they cumulatively value health less
R T
0 ½@qh=aðtÞ=@H0
dt\ 0, for intermediate life extension they value health cumulatively more
R T
0 ½@qh=aðtÞ=
@H0dt [ 0 and for large life extension they value health more at all ages, @qh/a(t)/@H0 > 0,∀t.
For proof, see online Appendix D.7.
WhenT can be optimally chosen, individuals with greater endowed health are healthier
throughout life, and live longer (Propositions 6 and 7).29 We distinguish between three
scenarios: ‘small’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘large’ life extension, as illustrated in Figure 3 (see
online Appendix Section D.7 and Figure 10 for more detail). For small life extension,
healthier individuals value health more than in the fixed T case, but cumulatively still less
than for the unperturbed path, and life is extended to TI. For intermediate life extension,
the relative marginal value of health is cumulatively higher compared with the
unperturbed path, but health is still valued less in old age. Life is extended to TII. For
large life extension, the relative marginal value of health is higher at all ages, and life is
extended toTIII. In such a scenario, healthy individuals caremore about their health as for
them investment pays off in terms of a longer lifespan over which the benefits of health,
consumption, and leisuremaybeenjoyed. Sincehealth investment increases in the valueof
health (see (15) and (17)) it follows similar patterns in these three scenarios.
Which scenario is more plausible depends on the extent to which medical
technology, institutional, and environmental factors, allow for endowed health to
extend life (@T/@H0): in developed countries with few competing risks from diseases,
universal access to health care, and cutting-edge medical technology, or in developing
nations where large gains in longevity can potentially be achieved with relatively low
cost interventions such as provision of clean water and improving sanitation. In our
calibrated simulations for an average US college graduate, we find @qh/a(t)/@H(t) < 0
for all ages (see Table 2 in Section C), which would be consistent with the ‘small’ life
extension scenario TI (see Figure 3 and for more detail Figure 10 in online
Appendix Section D.7) and is consistent with the empirical regularity that healthy
individuals consume less medical care (Van de Ven and van der Gaag, 1982; Wagstaff,
1986a; Erbsland et al., 2002).30
4.4. Variation in Work, Leisure and Retirement by SES and Health
Important variation exists across individuals both in the type of work and in the
amount of time spent working, during a day and over the life cycle. We first discuss
variation in the type of work and then turn to time spent working.
29 If, in contrast to our benchmark scenario, @qA(0)/@H0 > 0, then theoretically we cannot rule out that
@T/@H0 < 0 and that @H(t)/@H0 < 0 after some age t (see online Appendix D.5). This case would represent
an extreme scenario in which the complementarity between consumption and health in utility is so strong
that healthier individuals choose to spend much more on consumption and much less on health investment,
living shorter lives. This scenario is inconsistent with empirical stylised facts, e.g. that healthier people live
longer lives and with our calibrated simulations.
30 However, after accounting for the endogeneity of health, Galama et al. (2012) find that the effect of
health on medical care use becomes statistically insignificant, suggesting the negative association obtained in
empirical studies may not be sufficiently robust.
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4.4.1. Work and job-related health stress
A higher relative marginal value of health qh/a(t) induced by wealth (Proposition 3)
increases the health cost of job-related health stress (see (29)). Eventually, however,
wealth leads to better health (Proposition 3) and better health increases the marginal
benefit @Y/@z of job-related health stress through reduced sick time. Permanently
higher wages, e.g. through better education, are also associated with the above
competing wealth and health effects. In addition, the marginal benefit of job-related
health stress @Y/@z increases directly with the wage rate. Empirical evidence suggests
that high SES individuals on average work in less demanding occupations (Ravesteijn
et al., 2013). This suggests that higher SES increases the marginal costs of job-related
health stress more than it increases its marginal benefits.
The effect of health on job-related health stress is plausibly positive. Better health
reduces sick time, which increases the marginal benefit of job-related health stress.
Further, if the relative marginal value of health decreases in health (Propositions 5 and
7), then healthier individuals will have lower marginal costs of engaging in job-related
health stress. With higher benefits and lower costs, we expect the healthy to engage in
unhealthy jobs, consistent with empirical evidence (Kemna, 1987).
4.4.2. Leisure and retirement
To analyse retirement, we informally treat a small amount of time devoted to work
sw(t), i.e. below a certain threshold, say sR, as a retirement phase. With declining
health, time spent working sw(t) (see (6)) gradually decreases, as a result of
increasing sick time and the increasing demand for time devoted to health
investment. Hence, the model produces a phase of life in old age that naturally
qualifies as retirement. During working life, individuals divide their time between
work, leisure and time inputs into consumption and health investment (see (6)).
Therefore, we can infer the effect on the time spent working by investigating effects
on leisure and time inputs.
Wealth increases the demand for leisure, for (time inputs into) healthy and
unhealthy consumption, and for (time devoted to) health investment, through a
‘direct’ wealth effect, reducing the marginal value of wealth qA(t) and an ‘indirect’
value of health effect, increasing the relative marginal value of health (Proposition 3).
This leads wealthier individuals, ceteris paribus, to work less (see (6)), and hence retire
earlier, in line with empirical evidence (Imbens et al., 2001; Brown et al., 2010).31
Permanently higher wages, e.g. through education, are also associated with the above
wealth and value of health effects, but higher wages also increase the cost of time
inputs, i.e. of leisure, of healthy and unhealthy consumption and of health investment
(see subsections D.8.2 and D.8.3 in online Appendix D). The higher opportunity cost
of not working encourages higher educated individuals to retire later. Thus, the
wealthy retire earlier, but the higher educated and those with higher permanent wages
may retire later.
31 However, wealthy individuals are healthier (Proposition 3), which reduces sick time and increases the
benefit of work (earnings). The disparity in health grows over time, so that eventually the effect of better
health among the wealthy may become important in the retirement decision.
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Healthier individuals spend more time working, as good health reduces sick time
and reduces the demand for (time inputs into) health investment (Propositions 5 and
7). This encourages healthier individuals to work more and retire later (see (6)).
However, health is also associated with a wealth effect, reducing the marginal value of
wealth qA(t) (see Table 2 in online Appendix C), which increases the demand for
leisure and for (time inputs into) healthy and unhealthy consumption, and thereby
encourages early retirement.32 While the net effect is therefore ambiguous, it seems
plausible that the direct effect of health on reducing sick time and reducing time
inputs into health investment, outweighs the indirect effect of health on leisure by
relaxing the wealth constraint. This is consistent with an extensive literature showing
quantitatively large effects of health on labour force participaton, with unhealthier
individuals retiring earlier (Currie and Madrian, 1999; Smith, 2007).
PREDICTION 4. Under plausible assumptions, healthier individuals retire later. This,
combined with an effect of health on earnings, leads to reverse causality as healthier individuals
accumulate more wealth by earning more and retiring later.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
We have developed a theory of the relation between health and SES over the life
cycle. Our life-cycle model incorporates health, longevity, wealth, earnings, educa-
tion, work, job-related physical and psychosocial health stressors, leisure, health
investment (e.g. exercise, medical care) and healthy and unhealthy consumption
(including housing, neighbourhood social environment). Our review of the literature
identifies these as essential mechanisms in the formation and evolution of disparities
in health.
The theory is capable of reproducing stylised facts regarding the life-cycle profiles of
health and health investment, as illustrated by calibrated simulations of the model. The
theory is further able to reproduce stylised facts characteristic of the SES-health
gradient. We find that greater SES, as measured by wealth, earnings and education,
induces a healthy lifestyle: it encourages investment in health, encourages healthy
consumption, discourages unhealthy consumption and protects individuals from the
health risks of physically and psychosocially demanding working conditions. The
healthier lifestyle of high SES individuals causes the health trajectories of high and low
SES individuals to diverge. As a result, they are healthier and live longer (Propositions
2–4). In addition, health generates earnings and the worsening health of low SES
individuals potentially leads to early withdrawal from the labour force (Prediction 4).
This reverse causality from health to financial measures of SES potentially reinforces
the widening of the SES-health gradient, as documented in empirical studies (Smith,
2007).
In middle to late life, the divergence of health trajectories potentially slows as lower
levels of health encourages low SES individuals to invest more in health and engage in
healthier behaviour in order to slow down their health deterioration (Propositions 3
32 The amount of time devoted to work further depends on whether leisure, consumption and health are
complements or substitutes in utility.
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and 4). Also, mortality selection, i.e. the least healthy among lower SES individuals die
sooner, results in an apparently healthier surviving disadvantaged population,
potentially narrowing the gradient in late age.33 Thus, the theory is capable of
reproducing the characteristic life-cycle patterns of the SES-health gradient.
Apart from providing a framework to interpret stylised facts, the theory also makes
novel testable predictions and provides new intuition. In particular, we emphasise the
importance of our concept of a health cost (benefit) of unhealthy (healthy)
behaviours, in explaining health behaviour. Individuals make decisions regarding
health by taking into account not just monetary prices and preferences, but
additionally the life-time health consequences of their choices, as embodied by the
health cost (benefit). Variation in the health cost over the life cycle and across SES
potentially explains several empirical phenomena.
For example, we predict that individuals in mid-life, particularly the healthy and
poor, engage in work associated with unhealthy working conditions as they value the
associated wage premium. However, as individuals age they engage in healthier work,
as the health cost of unhealthy working conditions increase with declining health
(Prediction 1). Another implication of our concept of a health cost is a pattern in
which high SES individuals consume more of moderately unhealthy consumption
goods (e.g. moderate alcohol consumption) and less of severely unhealthy consump-
tion goods (e.g. cigarettes, high alcohol consumption, illicit drugs) than do lower SES
individuals (Prediction 3). Greater wealth permits more consumption but also
increases the health cost. This could provide an explanation for the observation that
high SES individuals are less likely to smoke cigarettes (bad for health) but are more
likely to be moderate drinkers (moderately bad) than low SES individuals (Cutler and
Lleras-Muney, 2008).
Another insight is that (endogenous) longevity is crucial in explaining observed
associations between SES and health (cf. Propositions 1, 3 and 4, and Prediction 2).
Absent ability to extend life (fixed horizon), the association between SES and health is
small (Proposition 1). If, however, life can be extended, SES and health are positively
associated and the greater the degree of life extension afforded by SES, the greater is
their association (Propositions 3 and 4). Thus, health disparities are larger in
environments where higher SES individuals can effectively use their resources to
extend life (Prediction 2). For example, if the latest medical technology is more easily
accessible to higher SES individuals, health disparities across SES groups may be larger.
In deriving predictions from the comparative dynamic analyses, we have made a
number of assumptions, most of which are conventional, such as diminishing marginal
utility and Cobb–Douglas production functions. Our calibrated model corroborated
other necessary relations. However, one assumption we had to make is that first-order
effects dominate second-order effects (Assumption 4 in subsection 2.4). Future work
could investigate the sensitivity of results to this assumption, although it is less
restrictive than the fairly conventional assumption of functions being additively
33 The narrowing of the gradient due to unhealthier individuals engaging in healthier behaviour would
represent an economic variant of the age-as-leveller hypothesis, while the narrowing of the gradient due to
mortality selection would be consistent with a process of cumulative advantage (House et al., 1994; Ross and
Wu, 1996; Lynch, 2003).
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separable in their arguments, and other (potentially stronger) assumptions are likely
needed to derive unambiguous predictions from the comparative dynamic analyses.
Future work may also extend the model to incorporate the joint determination of
SES and health (Chiteji, 2010; Conti et al., 2010), the evolution of child health (Case
et al., 2002; Currie and Stabile, 2003; Heckman, 2007) and the impact of fetal and
early-childhood conditions on health in adulthood (Barker et al., 1993; Case et al.,
2005).34 Early childhood could be included modelling the production of health by the
family, similar to, e.g. Jacobson (2000) and Bolin et al. (2001). We do not explicitly take
into account the influence of the wider social context and social relationships of the
family or neighbourhood on health (Kawachi and Berkman, 2003) or of social capital
on health (Bolin et al., 2003). Insights from the behavioural-economic and psycho-
logical literature regarding myopia and lack of self-control (Blanchflower et al., 2009)
might be incorporated following Laibson (1998). Uncertainty (e.g. health shocks)
could be included similar to, e.g. Cropper (1977), Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990),
Liljas (1998) and Ehrlich (2000).
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